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Agreements: The Case for Ethical 




By: Michael L. Russell* 
 
Dispute resolution design is an emerging field, both 
academically and professionally.  Attorneys, mediators, and 
arbitrators, the other roles in the alternative dispute 
resolution process, have codes of ethics which guide their 
conduct.1  Dispute resolution designers, however, have no 
such guidelines.2  This article uses the example of mandatory 
arbitration agreements in the employment context to 
 
* Michael L. Russell is the founder of Russell Dispute Resolutions, PLLC in 
Nashville, Tennessee.  He serves as a mediator and arbitrator in disputes across 
the United States.  Mr. Russell also teaches alternative dispute resolution at the 
Belmont University College of Law.  The author gratefully acknowledges 
Professor Rafael Gely at the University of Missouri College of Law, whose 
comments contributed significantly to this paper.  Any errors, however, are the 
author’s alone. 
1 For attorneys, see American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional 




For mediators see American Bar Association, Policy and Standards, ABA 
(2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/policy_standards/ 
For arbitrators, see American Arbitration Association, Revised Home 
Construction Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AAA (August 1, 
2018), 
https://go.adr.org/homeconstruction.html. 
2 Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute 
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 126 (2009). 
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illustrate why this lack of ethical guidelines for dispute 
resolutions designers is problematic.   
In recent years, mandatory arbitration agreements 
significantly impacted employment law and litigation.3  
Employers increasingly turn to mandatory arbitration as a 
way to resolve disputes more efficiently and cost 
effectively.4  While these are worthy goals, the results have 
often chilled employees’ substantive rights.5  
Employees often sign mandatory arbitration 
agreements without understanding their significance.6  
These agreements are frequently part of a large number of 
“onboarding” forms that must be signed.7  Indeed, 
employees often do not realize they have signed arbitration 
agreements until they file a lawsuit to claim an illegal 
employment practice.8  In these cases, employees are 
surprised to learn that they unknowingly waived important 
legal rights and, in some cases, effectively foreclosed their 
opportunity to seek legal relief.9  
The two most problematic provisions that often 
appear in mandatory arbitration agreements in the workplace 
 
3 Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration, 16 
GA. ST. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (1999). 
4 Alexander J.S. Colvin, The growing use of mandatory arbitration, ECON. 
POLICY INST. (April 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-
use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-
than-60-million-american-workers/.  See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Our 
Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-
Shaping Our Legal System, 122 DICK. L. REV. 349, 349 (2017). 
5 Edwards, supra note 4, at 293. 
6 Katherine Van Wezen Stone, Mandatory Arbitration: The Yellow Dog 
Contract of the ‘90s, 73 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 1017. 
7 Stone, supra note 7; Colvin, supra note 5.  
8 Stone, supra note 7; see also Kilgore & Kilgore, Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements Unfairly Deny Employee Rights, HG.ORG, 
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/mandatory-arbitration-agreements-unfairly-
deny-employee-rights-6859 [last visited Nov. 11, 2020]. 
9 Stone, supra note 7; see R. Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?, 
37 PEPP. L. REV. 459 (2010). 
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context are cost sharing provisions and class action (or 
multi-party) waivers.10 
Mandatory arbitration agreements—which require 
an employee to pay a significant cost of the arbitration—tend 
to chill the rights of employees, as many employees do not 
have the means to financially pursue their claims if they have 
to pay a significant deposit to an arbitrator or arbitration 
service.11  Fortunately, both the courts and arbitration 
organizations, such as the American Arbitration Association 
and JAMS, have recognized that cost splitting provisions 
may chill the rights of employees and have mitigated this 
risk.12   
Class action waivers in mandatory arbitration 
agreements, however, remain a problematic issue which 
prevents large numbers of employees from vindicating their 
rights.13  Courts have been hostile to efforts to minimalize 
the impact of class action waivers in arbitration agreements, 
and arbitration services have been powerless to ease their 
impact in light of the developing jurisprudence.14   
This paper will examine this issue and explore how 
the enforceability of mandatory arbitration in employment 
cases has evolved through the courts.  The paper will also 
discuss a possible path to overcoming the negative impact of 
 
10 In this paper, the term “class action waiver” is used broadly.  Often these 
waivers prohibit any multi-party action, regardless of whether it is brought as a 
“class action,” as that phrase is usually thought of in the context of FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23.  Unless specifically stated to the contrary, this paper will use the phrases 
“class action waiver” and “class waiver” loosely to mean any provision in an 
arbitration agreement that prohibits multi-party actions.  See generally Shankle 
v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th 
Cir. 1999).   
11 Edwards, supra note 4, at 293. 
12 Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 
1999); see JAMS Emp. Arb. Rules & Procs., Rule 31. 
13 Hensler, supra note 5, at 370. 
14 E.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019); Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 
(2010). 
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these agreements and propose a modification in the approach 
of dispute resolution designers that would provide a possible 
remedy.   
Dispute Systems Design 
 As a threshold matter, it is important to understand 
what we mean by “dispute systems design.”  Professor 
Stephanie Smith and Professor Janet Martinez, who teach 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) at Stanford, define 
“dispute systems design” as “one or more internal processes 
that have been adopted to prevent, manage or resolve a 
stream of disputes connected to an organization or 
institution.”15 
 This is a useful definition and broad enough to 
address the issues treated in this article.  To be sure, a 
mandatory mediation program instituted by a federal or state 
court would be a dispute system design.16  Likewise, a 
detailed contract between two sophisticated corporations 
which requires mediation and then arbitration in lieu of 
litigation would be a dispute system design.17  Neither of 
these examples raise the concerns addressed in this article.  
In the former example, a court ordered mediation program 
would likely be designed by neutral actors interested in the 
fair administration of justice.18  In the latter example, two 
well-resourced companies would likely be represented by 
competent counsel able to protect the interests of their 
respective clients.19 
 
15 Smith & Martinez, supra note 2, at 126. 
16 See generally How Do Courts Use ADR?, RESOL. SYS. INST. 
https://www.aboutrsi.org/resource-center/how-do-courts-use-adr. 
17 See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and 




18 RESOL. SYS. INST., supra note 17. 
19 Leslie Ann Berkoff, Andrew Barton, Serena K. Lee, Peter R. Day, & Susan 
Tomaine, Drafting ADR Clauses for Financial, M&A, and Joint Venture 
Disputes, AM. BAR ASS’N. (July 11, 2019), 
4
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/6
[Vol. 21: 173, 2021]                                  The Case for Ethical Standards 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL  
 
 177 
 Concerns arise, however, where a sophisticated 
actor hires an attorney to draft a dispute system design that 
will bind her client and a less sophisticated third party who 
is neither represented by counsel nor stands in an equal 
bargaining position.20  Examples would include mandatory 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts or executed by 
new employees at the beginning of their employment.21  This 
article uses the latter example to discuss the need for ethical 
guidance for dispute resolution designers, though much of 
the discussion would be just as applicable for other 
mandatory arbitration agreements, including consumer 
contracts. 
The Problem of Arbitration Agreements Drafted to 
Benefit Employers 
 Mandatory arbitration agreements began emerging 
in the non-union employment context during the 1990s.22  
These arbitration agreements were written by employers and 
drafted to their benefit.23  Judge Harry T. Edwards of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit observed 
the potential problems of mandatory employment arbitration 




20 See Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Are Discriminatory and Unfair, PUBLIC 
CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/article/mandatory-arbitration-clauses-are-
discriminatory-and-unfair/. 
21 PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 21. 
22 Katherine Van Wezen Stone, Mandatory Arbitration: The Yellow Dog 
Contract of the ‘90s, 73 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 1017 (1996); Harry T. Edwards, 
Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration, 16 GA. STATE L. REV. 293 
(2000). 
23 Edwards, supra note 4, at 297-98; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory 
Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKLEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 71 (2014). 
24 Edwards, supra note 4, at 293.  Judge Edwards’ background makes him an 
especially appropriate author to comment on this topic.  He wrote: 
The subject of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims 
in employment has been a matter of great interest to the 
courts in recent years.  My thinking on this subject is 
influenced by my current position as a federal judge.  It 
5
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Mandatory arbitration agreements in 
individual employees’ contracts often are 
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; 
there is no union to negotiate the terms of 
the arbitration arrangement.  Therefore, 
employers are free to structure arbitration 
in ways that may systematically 
disadvantage employees; for example, 
employers may limit the tools available to 
employees for gathering evidence or by 
prohibiting certain forms of relief.  Or, in 
order to discourage or prevent employees 
from bringing a claim, a company might try 
to impose a requirement that the employee 
pay fees for an arbitrator, court reporter, 
transcript, and hearing room-fees that 
easily run hundreds of dollars per day.25 
 
 Professor Katherine Van Wezen of the Cornell Law 
School and Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
argues that “[m]any pre-hire arbitral agreements are blatant 
contracts of adhesion.”26   
Some of these agreements required employers and 
employees to split the cost of the arbitration.27  Courts have 
 
is also informed, however, by my former work as a labor 
law practitioner in Chicago, my time as a labor law 
teacher and scholar at the University of Michigan and 
Harvard Law School, my extensive practice as a neutral 
labor arbitrator for more than ten years, and my 
significant involvements with the National Academy of 
Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service during the time when I was an arbitrator.  In 
other words, because of my career path, I have more than 
a fleeting interest in the subject. 
25  Edwards, supra note 4, at 297-98.  
26 Stone, supra note 7, at 1036. 
27 Edwards, supra note 4, at 302.  
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responded to these provisions with hostility.28  Judges have 
largely understood that requiring employees with limited 
means to share in the fees of a private arbitrator would likely 
foreclose many claimants from having an opportunity to 
have their disputes heard.29   
 In a 2000 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court 
observed, “It may well be that the existence of large 
arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively 
vindicating her statutory rights.”30  In the employment 
context, some courts have held that a provision in the 
arbitration agreement which makes the employee 
responsible for his or her share of the arbitrator’s fee renders 
the agreement unenforceable.31   
 Even if a cost-splitting provision in an arbitration 
agreement does not render it per se void, courts are still 
hesitant to enforce them where there is a risk they could 
effectively preclude a claimant from vindicating their 
rights.32  The Sixth Circuit, for example, held that “potential 
litigants must be given an opportunity, prior to arbitration on 
the merits, to demonstrate that the potential costs of 
arbitration are great enough to deter them and similarly 
situated individuals from seeking to vindicate their federal 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”33  If claimants are able 
to make this showing, then they cannot be forced into 
arbitration.34   
 
28 See Brady v. Williams Capital Grp., No. 114198/06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 
Apr. 30, 2009) (finding a fee-splitting provision in the arbitration clause 
unenforceable on public policy grounds). 
29 Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-
Vindication Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 
411–412 (2014). 
30 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
31 See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234–
35 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding requirement that employee pay half of the 
arbitration costs inconsistent with the remedial nature of anti-discrimination 
laws). 
32 Chukwumerije, supra note 30. 
33 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003). 
34 See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663. 
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 The hesitancy of courts to force employees to share 
equally in the arbitrator’s fees is shared by dispute resolution 
organizations.35  For example, other than a modest filing fee 
in the event the claimant(s) initiate the arbitration, the 
American Arbitration Association and JAMS also generally 
require the employer to pay the arbitrator’s fee and other 
costs associated with the arbitration.36   
 Regretfully, employees have not been as fortunate 
when opposing arbitration agreements that prohibit class or 
multi-party actions.37  Much of the early case law 
surrounding class action arises in the consumer context.  In 
2011, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the case that 
opened the door to our discussion, AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion.38  In Concepcion, the Court held that 
agreements that require individual arbitrations are 
enforceable.39   
 Another hammer on the nail of class arbitrations 
came in 2010.40  In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court addressed arbitration 
agreements that were silent on whether class actions were 
permitted in a particular dispute.41  The Court held that an 
arbitration agreement that is silent as to whether class 
 
35 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Employment Workplace Fee 
Schedule (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Employment_Fee_Schedule1Nov19.pd
f (last visited March 22, 2020); JAMS, Arbitration Schedule of Fees and Costs, 
https://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-fees (last visited March 22, 2020).  
36 See sources cited supra note 36. 
37 See Kacey L. Weddle, Supreme Court Rules That Employee Class Action 
Waivers Are Valid, AM. BAR ASSOC. (June 21, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/products-
liability/practice/2018/supreme-court-rules-that-employee-class-action-
waivers-are-valid/. See generally infra notes 39-53. 
38 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
39 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341. 
40 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
41 559 U.S. at 666. 
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arbitrations are permitted must go forward on solely an 
individual basis.42   
 Taking the next step toward relegating class 
arbitrations to the ash heap of history, the Court handed 
down American Express v. Italian Colors in 2013.43  In 
Italian Colors, the Court held that a provision in an 
arbitration agreement that prevented class actions was 
enforceable—even if it rendered it economically infeasible 
for claimants to pursue individual claims.44 
 The final nail in the coffin for class arbitrations 
likely came with the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in 
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela.45  In Lamps Plus, the lower court 
distinguished Stolt-Neilsen and held that class-wide 
arbitration was permitted because the agreement at issue was 
“ambiguous on the issue of class arbitration.”46  Writing for 
the majority, Chief Justice Roberts rejected this reasoning 
and concluded that class arbitrations were prohibited, even 
where agreements were ambiguous as to whether they were 
allowed.47   
 For a brief time—during the Supreme Court’s 
march from Concepcion to Lamps Plus—employee rights 
advocates saw reason for hope in turning back the 
momentum in favor of class action waivers.48  In 2012, the 
National Labor Relations Board handed down the D.R. 
Horton decision.49  This ruling found that class action 
waivers in the employment context violated Section 7 of the 
 
42 See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–87. 
43 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
44 Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
45 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
46 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1413.  Cf. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–87. 
47 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416–17. 
48 Krista M. Cabrera & Christopher Ward, Whatever the Court Decides It Won’t 
End the Debate Over Class Action vs. Individual Arbitration. TALENT 
MANAGEMENT & HR (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.tlnt.com/whatever-the-
court-decides-it-wont-end-the-debate-over-class-action-vs-individual-
arbitration/.   
49 D.R. Horton, Inc. 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012). 
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National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which rendered 
contracts void if they prohibited concerted activity.50 
 When employee rights advocates attempted to use 
the D.R. Horton decision in federal courts to invalidate class 
waivers, they were met with mixed results.  The Second, 
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits rejected the NLRB’s reasoning in 
D.R. Horton.51  By contrast, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits agreed with the reasoning in D.R. Horton, holding 
that the arbitration agreements that prohibited class actions 
were invalid under the National Labor Relations Act.52 
 The timing of this circuit split led some employee 
rights advocates to believe that the stars were aligning.53  In 
Epic Systems v. Lewis—which would resolve the circuit 
split—the petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the 
U.S. Supreme Court on September 2, 2016—approximately 
two months before the presidential election.54 
 Judge Merrick Garland had been nominated by 
President Obama to fill the vacancy on the Court left by the 
untimely death of the late Justice Antonin Scalia.55  Judge 
Garland’s nomination had been stalled by Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell, who would not bring his 
 
50 D.R. Horton, Inc. 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012). 
51 Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., 659 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2016);  
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015);  D.R. 
Horton, Inc. v. NLRB 713 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013);  Cellular Sales of Mo., 
LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2016);  Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc. 
702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).  Cf. D.R. Horton, Inc. 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012). 
52 NLRB v. Alt. Ent., Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2017); Morris v. Ernst 
& Young, 834 F.3d 975, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2016); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 
F.3d 1147, 1160 (7th Cir. 2016).   
53 Cabrera & Ward, supra note 49.   
54 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).  For this case’s 
procedural history, see 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/16-285.html 
[last visited March 24, 2020]. 
55 Ron Elving, What Happened With Merrick Garland In 2016 And Why It 
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nomination before the Senate until after the presidential 
election.56   
 This led progressives to believe that, at worst, they 
would have the slightly left-of-center Garland.  At best, they 
hoped for a more progressive nominee than Garland, who 
would assure them a liberal majority on the Court.57  This 
hinged, of course, on the view that former Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton was likely to win the general election in 
November of 2016.58 
 Of course, to the surprise of many, President Donald 
Trump won the election and subsequently nominated Neil 
Gorsuch to the vacancy left by Justice Scalia.59  Judge 
Garland never received a hearing, and Justice Gorsuch’s 
confirmation solidified the conservative majority on the 
Court.60  
 When Epic Systems was ultimately decided on May 
21, 2018, it was Justice Neil Gorsuch who wrote the majority 
opinion.61  The Court’s opinion rejected the reasoning of the 
NLRB in D.R. Horton and held that class waivers in 
arbitration agreements do not violate the National Labor 
Relations Act’s prohibition against contracts that ban 
concerted activity.62  The D.R. Horton decision, which held 
much promise for employee rights advocates, was 
overturned, and the validity of class action waivers is now 
well-settled.63  The Court’s subsequent decision in Lamps 
 
56 Elving, supra note 56. 
57 Adam Liptak & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Shadow of Merrick Garland Hangs 
Over the Next Supreme Court Fight, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 19th, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/us/ginsburg-vacancy-garland.html. 
58 Liptak & Stolberg, supra note 58.  
59 Julie Hirshfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch to the 
Supreme Court, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-court-nominee-
trump.html. 
60 Davis & Landler, supra note 60.  
61 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018). 
62 Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1632. 
63 See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1620–21, 1630. 
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Plus (discussed above) was simply the period on the end of 
a sentence which had already been written.64  
The Attorney’s Fiduciary Duty to the Client 
 In the employment context of course, arbitration 
agreements with class action waivers are almost universally 
drafted by attorneys who represent employers.65  Under the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) Rules of Professional 
Conduct, an attorney must negotiate several roles.66  He or 
she “is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal 
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for 
the quality of justice.”67  The Rules also provide that, “[i]n 
addition to these representational functions, a lawyer may 
serve as a third-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role 
helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other matter.”68  
 While the attorney must balance these roles, the 
lawyer nevertheless ultimately owes a fiduciary duty to the 
client.69  Indeed the attorney owes a duty of undivided 
loyalty to the client, which is breached when the attorney 
acts on behalf of parties with conflicting interests.70  As a 
consequence, lawyers who represent clients seeking to avoid 
employment class actions at all costs will be duty-bound to 
draft arbitration agreements containing class waivers.  The 
problem, of course, is that these agreements are one-sided 
and serve as a barrier for claimants with small claims from 
 
64 See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct 1407, 1412 (2019). 
65 Edwards, supra note 4, at 297. 
66 See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
67 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. § 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
68 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. § 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  While 
Rules 1.12 and 2.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct give some 
minimum guidance to the conduct of attorneys acting as neutrals, the primary 
guidance for mediator conduct is from other sources, which shall be discussed 
infra. 
69 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 § 11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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aggregating them, which would attract the most competent 
counsel possible.71  
The Neutral’s Duty of Impartiality 
 In contrast to the attorney who represents a specific 
party, a neutral must be impartial.72  Because the concept of 
an attorney as a neutral is more recent than the ancient 
practice of the lawyer representing the interests of their 
client, a well-developed and ingrained set of ethical rules for 
mediators does not exist.  However, the significant efforts 
over approximately the last twenty-five years to produce 
standard for neutrals have uniformly affirmed the impartial 
nature of a neutral’s role.73  
 For example, Rules 1.12 and 2.4 of the ABA Rules 
of Professional Conduct briefly address issues mediators 
may face, and the requirements stated in those rules clearly 
affirm the importance of impartiality.74  Rule 1.12 addresses 
the attorney–client relationship.75  Generally speaking, 
absent consent of the parties, it prohibits a lawyer from 
representing a party in a matter in which the lawyer 
previously served as a neutral.76  It also generally prohibits a 
lawyer from negotiating potential employment with 
someone who is involved in a case where the lawyer is 
serving as a neutral.77  Rule 2.4 primarily emphasizes that a 
lawyer serving as a neutral must make sure that the parties 
in the matter understand that the lawyer/neutral does not 
represent them.78 
In addition to the broad guidance of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, there are other resources that 
 
71 See Colvin, supra note 24, at 85. 
72 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
73 See generally MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS. (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2005). 
74 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.12, 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
75 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
76 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.12(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
77 MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.12(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
78 MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT. r. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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provide ethical guidance for those who specifically serve as 
mediators.79  For example, the Model Standards for Mediator 
Conduct were first drafted in 1994 and revised in 2005.80  
They originated as a joint effort between the American 
Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association 
Dispute Resolution Section, and the Association for Conflict 
Resolution.81  Under Standard II, “[a] mediator shall decline 
a mediation if the mediator cannot conduct it in an impartial 
manner.  Impartiality means freedom from favoritism, bias, 
or prejudice.”82   
Similar guidance exists when the neutral is serving 
as an arbitrator.83  For example, Cannon I of the Code of 
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes provides that 
a potential neutral “should accept appointment as an 
arbitrator only if fully satisfied . . . that he or she can serve 
impartially [and] that he or she can serve independently from 
the parties, potential witnesses, and the other arbitrators . . . 
.”84  There are also prohibitions on future professional 
opportunities for arbitrators in order to maintain their 
neutrality.85 
Similarly, JAMS has promulgated guidelines which 
provide: 
An Arbitrator should remain impartial 
throughout the course of the Arbitration.  
Impartiality means freedom from 
 
79 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005). 
80 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005). 
81 Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/modelSTDSd.cfm, MEDIATE.COM (Feb. 
2005). 
82 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 74, at 
Standard II. 
83 See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (AM. ARB. ASS’N 2004). 
84 See AM. ARB. ASS’N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL 
DISPUTES, supra note 84, at B(1)-(2). 
85 See AM. ARB. ASS’N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL 
DISPUTES, supra note 84, at C. 
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favoritism either by word or action.  The 
Arbitrator should be aware of and avoid the 
potential for bias based on the Parties’ 
backgrounds, personal attributes or 
conduct during the Arbitration, or based on 
the Arbitrator’s pre-existing knowledge of 
or opinion about the merits of the dispute 
being arbitrated.  An Arbitrator should not 
permit any social or professional 
relationship with a Party, insurer or counsel 
to a Party to an Arbitration to affect his or 
her decision-making.  If an Arbitrator 
becomes incapable of maintaining 
impartiality, the Arbitrator should 
withdraw.86 
 
Therefore, the critical importance of neutrals being 
impartial is well-settled.  As discussed above, however, 
arbitration agreements which prohibit class actions are 
common.87  These leave employees with relatively small 
claims no vehicle to hold employers accountable.88  
The conundrum thus presents itself.  The arbitrator 
should be impartial, and the arbitration should be fair.  
However, the attorney who drafts the arbitration agreement, 
because of his or her ethical rules, must not be impartial.89  
The Supreme Court, which should be the arbiter of due 
process, has unequivocally rejected virtually all challenges 
to draconian class action waivers. 
The Importance of Stakeholder Involvement 
 One gravamen of the problem with one-sided 
dispute design systems is the lack of stakeholder 
 
86 JAMS ARBITRATOR ETHICS GUIDELINES VI(A). 
87 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012). 
88 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012). 
89 Edwards, supra note 4, at 302; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 § 11 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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consideration.90  In mandatory arbitration agreements, 
employees frequently do not realize they have signed one.91  
They certainly did not participate in the design of the dispute 
system.  Yet scholars have consistently observed that 
stakeholder involvement is critical to dispute design 
process.92  Professors Smith and Martinez have written that 
“[s]ystem dysfunction can often be attributed to failure to 
adequately involve and acknowledge the interests of key 
stakeholder groups.”93 
 It is important to observe where controversy exists 
in the arbitration field.  Complex commercial agreements 
often contain arbitration agreements.94  Sophisticated parties 
to these agreements engage in arm’s length negotiations and 
make the reasoned decision that private arbitration is 
preferable to the more expensive and drawn out litigation 
process.  The same is true, for example, in the construction 
context.95  Builders, architects, and other stakeholders in 
construction projects routinely choose arbitration over 
litigation for similar reasons.96 
 In the employment and consumer context, however, 
controversy abounds.  This is primarily because employees 
and consumers have no input in the language and structure 





90 NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL, DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR 
MANAGING DISPUTES, 70-73 (2d ed. 2018).  
91 See generally supra notes 39-53; Signing an Arbitration Agreement with Your 
Employer, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/signing-
arbitration-agreement-with-employer-30005.html [last visited Nov. 11, 2020]. 
92 See Smith & Martinez, supra note 2. 
93 Smith & Martinez, supra note 2, at 131.  
94 Smith & Martinez, supra note 2, at 138. 
95 Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing 
Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 123, 154 (2007). 
96 Schmitz, supra note 96, at 154. 
97 Smith & Martinez, supra note 2, at 144; ROGERS ET AL, supra note 91, at 73. 
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A Suggested Path Forward 
 Because the courts have largely closed the door to 
challenges to unfair class waivers, it is the obligation of the 
profession to address the issue.98  The difficulty is that, while 
ethical obligations for arbitrators and mediators have 
continued to develop, ethical considerations for dispute 
systems designers have not.99  Indeed, there is an ethical 
vacuum in the area of dispute resolution design. 
 Two significant steps should be taken toward 
remedying this problem.  First, the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct should be amended.100  Second, 
because the Model Rules apply only to attorneys and the 
universe of dispute resolution designers is broader than 
lawyers, comprehensive standards of conduct for dispute 
resolution designers should be developed.101  
Regarding the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, paragraph 3 of the Preamble  should be 
amended.102  As previously noted, the Preamble currently 
states that “[i]n addition to these representational functions, 
a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral, a 
nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a 
dispute or other matter.”103  This provision should be revised 
to add a specific statement affirming that if an attorney is 
acting as a “dispute resolution designer” where a party to an 
arbitration agreement is likely to be unrepresented at the 
 
98 As noted earlier, an attorney is more than just a technician for the wishes of 
his or her client.  Rather a lawyer is “an officer of the legal system and a public 
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” MODEL RULES 
OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 
N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012) 
99 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute Systems 
Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons From International 
and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195 (2009). 
100 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
101 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
102 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).   
103 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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time of execution, then the attorney is “acting as a 
neutral.”104 
 This simple statement would provide significant 
protection to unrepresented parties.  It would bring those 
drafting arbitration agreements within the ethical boundaries 
of 2.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.105  Rule 2.4 
says, “A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the 
lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the 
lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that 
has risen between them.” (emphasis added).106 
 The plain language of Rule 2.4 means that a neutral 
cannot simultaneously serve as a lawyer for one of the 
parties.107  This means that a company desiring an ADR 
program with an arbitration agreement would have to retain 
the services of someone other than its own lawyer.  Such a 
result would provide the bar with an opportunity to develop 
a robust practice for “neutral dispute resolution designers.”  
These professionals, acting as neutrals, would then not be 
encumbered with the fiduciary duty to one party that 
currently restrains many drafters of ADR programs.108  
 Rather, neutral dispute resolution designers would 
be able to freely consider the interests of all the various 
stakeholders to an ADR program.  Because they should be 
impartial, these professionals would be much more able to 
determine whether it was proper to include a class action 
waiver in an arbitration agreement.109  While it might be 
proper for these professionals to consider the economic 
impact a class action lawsuit would have on an employer, 
 
104 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
105 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
106 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  
107 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
108 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 71, at 633. 
109 See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-
MANAGEMENT DISPUTES 1(C)(3) (prohibiting arbitrators from engaging in 
conduct that would compromise or appear to compromise the arbitrators’ 
impartiality).   
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they would also be obligated to consider the impact a class 
waiver would have on employees.110  If a designer believed 
that a class waiver would chill the ability for employees to 
pursue their substantive rights, then they would be able to 
disregard the employer’s desire for a class waiver without 
breaching any fiduciary duty owed to one party over the 
other. 
 Second, a comprehensive set of ethical rules for 
dispute resolution designers should be adopted.  Such a 
move is not without precedent.111  As noted previously, 
various stakeholders came together in 1994 to develop the 
Model Standards for Mediator Conduct.112  A similar effort 
should be made to develop guidance for those professionals 
who serve as dispute resolution designers. 
 To be sure, these proposals are not magic bullets.  
Those who retain dispute resolution designers will likely 
attempt to exert influence over them.113  It is the power of 
the purse.  Nevertheless, these steps would have both 
positive direct and indirect impacts. 
 First, in the case of attorneys, these proposals carry 
an extra measure of accountability.  Failing to draft dispute 
designs which are fair and even-handed toward all 
stakeholders would leave attorneys exposed to disciplinary 
actions which would be costly to both their reputation and 
finances.114 
 
110 See Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The arbitration 
epidemic, ECON. POLICY INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/. 
111 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
112 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
113 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) 
(prohibiting interference with a lawyer’s professional judgment by one who 
recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).  
114 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) 
(categorizing it is a professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt 
to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another 
to do so, or do so through the acts of another). 
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For all designers, regardless of whether they are 
attorneys, a set of ethical standards would begin the path 
toward establishing dispute design as a profession that 
exercises a measure of independence.  Peers would be 
expected to hold each other accountable for developing 
systems that reflect the interests of those who are 
impacted.115  There may also be an indirect impact on courts.  
If professional standards are drafted, which create ethical 
norms, courts may be more willing to scrutinize one-sided 
arbitration agreements with class waivers.  
Finally, and most importantly, neutral designers 
would be free to bring all stakeholders to the table.  In the 
employment context, this means that employees could be 
consulted.  Surveys could be taken.  Input could be received.  
The final arbitration agreement would reflect the interests of 
both employers and employees.  Yes, this likely means that 
class action waivers would be relegated to the ash heap of 
history.  Still, employment arbitration would be left to look 
more like it should: an efficient, fair, and cost-effective 
process designed to bring disputes to a conclusion sooner, 
cheaper, and more justly than protracted litigation.116  
Conclusion 
 Greater ethical guidance for dispute resolution 
designers is sorely needed.  Mandatory arbitration of 
employment claims is an especially useful illustration of 
why this is so.  With the Supreme Court’s most recent 
decisions in Epic Systems and Lamps Plus, mandatory 
arbitration agreements are likely to be an even more sought-
after method for employers to eliminate the risk of 
 
115 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) 
(requiring attorneys to report instances of observed violation of the Model 
Rules). 
116 Barbara Kate Repa, Pros and Cons of Arbitration, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html 
[last visited Nov. 11, 2020]. 
 
20
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/6
[Vol. 21: 173, 2021]                                  The Case for Ethical Standards 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL  
 
 193 
meritorious class action lawsuits.117  The unavailability of a 
class action may well eliminate the ability of employees with 
small individual claims, but significant aggregate claims, to 
vindicate their rights.  
 Currently, attorneys who are retained by employers 
are ethically required to give their allegiance to their clients, 
even when the resulting agreement is procedurally and 
substantively unfair to the unrepresented worker who signed 
it.118  The federal courts have been unwilling to even the 
proverbial playing field.119  Instead, the United States 
Supreme Court has handed down a line of cases, uniformly 
upholding arbitration agreements containing class action 
waivers.120  It is therefore incumbent on the legal profession, 
as professionals who are to advocate for a system that fairly 
administers justice,121 to intercede.  
A prudent path forward is through the ABA Rules 
of Professional Conduct, which govern attorney conduct.122  
The Rules should be amended to specify that attorneys who 
are retained to draft ADR programs impacting unrepresented 
employees are “third-party neutrals.”  As neutrals, they are 
to act impartially and consider the interests of all 
stakeholders.  Such a revision in the Rules, which are heavily 
relied on by states, would be an important step toward 
restoring the rights of workers whose valid claims are often 
chilled by arbitration agreements containing class action 
waivers.  In addition, comprehensive standards of conduct 
 
117 Epic Sys. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 
S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
118 MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
119 Am. Express v. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Epic Sys. v. Lewis, 138 
S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
120 See cases cited supra note 120. 
121 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) 
(commenting, “This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of 
the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative 
process.”).   
122 MODEL CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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for dispute resolution designers should be drafted, which 
would further an expectation that designers act 
independently with the interests of all stakeholders in mind.  
22
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